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Abstract
In this work we develop an agent-based model where hysteresis in major macroeconomic
variables (e.g. GDP, productivity, unemployment) emerges out of the decentralized interac-
tions of heterogeneous firms and workers. Building upon the model in Dosi et al. (2016, 2017),
we specify an endogenous process of accumulation of workers’ skills and a state-dependent
process of entry, studying their hysteretic impacts. Indeed, hysteresis is ubiquitous. However,
this is not due to market imperfections, but rather to the very functioning of decentralised
economies characterised by coordination externalities and dynamic increasing returns. So,
contrary to the insider-outsider hypothesis (Blanchard and Summers, 1986), the model does
not support the findings that rigid industrial relations may foster hysteretic behaviour in
aggregate unemployment. On the contrary, in line with the recent discussion in Ball et al.
(2014), this contribution provides evidence that during severe downturns, and thus declining
aggregate demand, phenomena like lower investment and innovation rates, skills deteriora-
tion, and declining entry dynamics are better candidates to explain long-run unemployment
spells and lower output growth. In that, more rigid labour markets dampen hysteretic dy-
namics by supporting aggregate demand, thus making the economy more resilient.
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1 Introduction
In this work, we develop an agent-based model able to display the endogenous emergence of
hysteresis out of the interaction of heterogeneous firms and workers. The paper focuses on both
the causes and the consequences of the hysteretical properties of macroeconomic time series,
including GDP, productivity, and unemployment. Further, refining upon Dosi et al. (2016,
2017), we introduce an endogenous process of accumulation of skills, and a state-dependent
process of entry, studying their hysteretic effects.
As we shall briefly discuss below, there are different notions of hysteresis. Basically, they boil
down to three different interpretations of the phenomenon (more in Piscitelli et al., 2000, Hallett
and Piscitelli, 2002, Amable et al., 2004). The first is formulated in terms of the persistence in
the deviations from some equilibrium path; the second is defined as a random-walk dynamics
in equilibrium itself; the third, we believe a more genuine one, is in terms of the heterogeneous
and non-linear responses of a system characterised by multiple equilibria or path-dependent
trajectories. Even if Piscitelli et al. (2000) (p. 59-60) define the former two as bastard usages
of the notion of hysteresis, they have been the most common in economics, at least, concerning
labour market dynamics, since Blanchard and Summers (1986), who, using the second of the
foregoing interpretations, attempted to explain structural unemployment in the late 1980’s at
around 10% in many European countries and quite far from the predicted 2-3% equilibrium
unemployment level:
The recent European experience has led to the development of alternative theories of
unemployment embodying the idea that the equilibrium unemployment rate depends
on the history of the actual unemployment rate. Such theories may be labelled
hysteresis theories after the term in the physical sciences referring to situations where
equilibrium is path-dependent. [Blanchard and Summers (1987), pag. 1]
Two alternative hypotheses were proposed by the authors in order to explain the emergence of
hysteresis, namely a first one resting on the membership channel according to which only insider
workers are able to exert pressure in the wage setting process, and a second one based on the
duration channel, because the long-term unemployed are less relevant in the wage determination
process. In the latter case, unemployment duration can (a) induce a process of worker skills
deterioration, implying that the long-term unemployed experiences a fall in their productivity;
(b) trigger search discouragement in unemployed people, less re-employable, and so less prone
to search in the labour market.
Together with the supply side channels emphasized from the eighties, some acknowledgement
has gone to aggregate demand shocks conceived as potential sources of hysteresis in the current
economic crisis. Therefore, the notion of hysteresis has been extended from unemployment to
permanent output loss. Blanchard et al. (2015) revisit hysteresis as the permanent effect exerted
by crises on the the levels of output relative to the pre-crises one. The work suggests a sustained
output gap in 69% of the cases, among 22 countries in the period 1960-2010, where in 47% of
them the recession was followed by an increased output gap, meaning that recessionary periods
affected not only the levels but also the subsequent growth rates, an effect renamed by Ball (2014)
as super-hysteresis. In fact, Ball (2014) reports that over 23 countries in the period 2007-2014,
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most of them have been hit by severe recession, and some of them, like Greece, faced up to 30%
losses in potential output.
[...] in most countries the loss of potential output is almost as large as the shortfall
of actual output from its pre-crisis trend. This finding implies that hysteresis effects
have been very strong during the Great Recession. Second, in the countries hit hard-
est by the recession, the growth rate of potential output is significantly lower today
than it was before 2008. This growth slowdown means that the level of potential
output is likely to fall even farther below its pre-crisis trend in the years to come.
[Ball (2014), p. 2]
The empirical detection of hysteresis, of course, goes together with the analysis of its deter-
minants. Agent-based models (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008) are
particularly suitable to the task as one knows by construction the micro data-generating process
and thus can explore the possible hysteretic features of aggregate variables as emergent prop-
erties of the evolutionary dynamics.1 The model, built upon the “Keynes meets Schumpeter”
family of models (Dosi et al., 2010, Napoletano et al., 2012, Dosi et al., 2013, Dosi et al., 2015,
2016,?, 2017), as we shall see, is able to generically yield hysteresis in the macro variables under
scrutiny both inter-regimes2 and intra-regimes. Indeed, hysteresis is ubiquitous.
However, this is not due to market imperfections but rather to the very functioning of decen-
tralised economies characterised by coordination externalities and dynamic increasing returns,
and, contrary to what is suggested by Blanchard and Summers (1986), the model does not
support the hypothesis that rigid industrial relations, via the insider-outsider channel, are the
driving source of hysteresis in aggregate unemployment. On the contrary, more in line with
Ball et al. (2014), our work indicates that during severe downturns and thus declining aggre-
gate demand, phenomena like lower investment and innovation rates, skills deterioration, and
declining entry dynamics are better candidates to explain long term unemployment spells and
lower output growth. In such a framework, more rigid labour markets, by supporting aggregate
demand, do not foster hysteresis but rather contain it, making the economy more resilient.
The paper is organised as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2 discusses the nature
and the sources of hysteresis. In Section 3, we present the model structure. The empirical
regularities matched by the K+S model are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we study the
emergence and the causes of hysteresis. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The nature and determinants of hysteresis
In this section, we provide a brief exploration on the sources and potential channels which might
induce hysteretic behaviours in the economy.
1See Fagiolo and Roventini (2012, 2017) for critical surveys on macro ABMs. See also Bassi and Lang (2016)
for an agent-based model with investment hysteresis. For related ABMs which consider a decentralised labour
market, see Dawid et al. (2014), Russo et al. (2015), Caiani et al. (2016) and Caiani et al. (2016), among the
others.
2Namely, across institutional regimes governing the labour markets, i.e. Fordist vs. Competitive. More on
that in Section 3.5.
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2.1 The nature of hysteresis
Hysteresis, a concept adopted from the natural sciences but with many similar instances in
economics, is a nonlinear mechanism, often implying multiple time trajectories and equilibria.
In a very broad perspective, a dynamical system can be considered hysteretical when the time
trajectories of some or all of its variables do exhibit path-dependency, in turn also implying
non-ergodicity. The very notion of multiple paths for the development of both socio-economic
and natural complex systems ultimately rests on the idea that history is an essential part of
the interpretation of many dynamic phenomena. The property that history matters is also
intimately related to that of time irreversibility, that is a situation where it is not possible, even
theoretically, to “reverse the arrow of time” and still expect to recover invariant properties of
the system under investigation.
However, in tackling path-dependent phenomena in the social sciences, an intrinsic difficulty
rests also in the fact that frequently only one of the many possible realizations of the system,
dependent on its initial state, is empirically observed. In fact, is history-dependence only shaped
by initial conditions or does it relate also to irreversible effects of some particular unfolding events
(e.g., crises or regime changes)? Related, how do the set of all possible evolutionary paths are
shaped and constrained by the structure inherited from the past?3
In economics, the very notion of hysteresis has only been acknowledged with difficulties and
often in the most restrictive interpretations. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, a stream of literature
has faced head-on the challenge of non-linearity of growth processes and thus the multiplicity
of paths and the related hysteretic properties (good examples are the contributions in Anderson
et al., 1988 and Day and Chen, 1993).4 However, such a stream of investigation was progressively
marginalized, possibly due to its theoretical “revolutionary” implications, particularly in terms of
equilibria selection, and welfare theorems. A “safer” path has been that of formalizing the phe-
nomenon based on linear stochastic models with close-to-unit-root auto-regressive processes. In
their seminal contribution, Blanchard and Summers (1986) identify hysteresis in the unemploy-
ment series whenever the coefficient of persistence ρ in the equation Ut = ρUt−1 +αt+ t+ θt−1
was estimated to be greater or equal to one.
Whether or not a (close to) unit-root process is an adequate signal of hysteresis has been
strongly debated. Recently, Gal´ı (2015) explores, without conclusive results, three alternative
sources for a unit-root process of the European unemployment rate, testing whether they lie (i)
in the natural rate of unemployment (Unt = U
n
t−1 + t), (ii) in the central bank inflation target
(pi∗t = pi∗t−1 + ∗t ), or (iii) in the insider-outsider hysteresis hypothesis (a` la Blanchard-Summers)
via alternative specifications for the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve.
In general, this modelling approach has been based on a somewhat naive epistemology – like
“Which processes should present unit-roots? The natural rate of unemployment, the inflation
target, the wage setting curve?” –, without jeopardizing the underlying unique equilibrium as-
sumption. The obvious dissatisfaction with the (linear) unit-root process approach is currently
bringing a revival of the importance of the detection of nonlinearities in empirical macroe-
conomics: so, for example, Beaudry et al. (2016) examining a few empirical time series, like
3For a further discussion on those issues see Castaldi and Dosi (2006).
4The hysteretic properties of economic systems is also emphasized in some post-Keynesian literature: see
Davidson, 1991, 1993.
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unemployment and working hours, do find evidence of cyclical recurrent patterns not detectable
when estimating auto-regressive linear stochastic models, therefore questioning the widespread
use of such methods.
However, the critique to the unit-root process approach is deeper and concerns the very
underlying theory: as suggested by Piscitelli et al. (2000), Hallett and Piscitelli (2002), Amable
et al. (2004) and Bassi and Lang (2016), genuine models of hysteresis should embed a nonlin-
ear structure. According to Piscitelli et al. (2000), three features characterise the memory of
hysteretic processes, namely, non-linearity, selectivity, remanence. Being this memory process
nonlinear, reversing a shock may not allow the system to recover its starting point. Moreover,
selectivity means that not all shocks affect the system with the same weight. Finally, remanence
entails that temporary shocks may lead to permanent new states.
Widespread origins of hysteresis in the socio-economic domain are, first, feedback mecha-
nisms related to coordination externalities, and, second, amplification processes stemming from
some form of increasing returns.5 In particular, it is frequently derived from (i) positive feed-
backs between levels of aggregate activities and innovative search, and (ii) powerful interactions
between the aggregate demand and the diffusion of innovations. Whenever one abandons the
unfortunate idea that the macroeconomic system is held up to some mysteriously stable and
unique equilibrium path, it could well be that negative demand shocks exert persistent effects,
because less aggregate demand entails less innovative search, which in turn entails less innovation
stemming from technological shocks:
[During recessionary phases], typically firms also reduce their expenditures in R&D
and productivity-enhancing expenditures. The reduction in output reduces oppor-
tunities to “learn by doing”. Thus, the attempt to pare all unnecessary expenditures
may have a concomitant effect on long-run productivity growth. In this view, the
loss from a recession may be more than just the large, but temporary, costs of idle
and wasted resources: the growth path of the economy may be permanently lowered.
[Stiglitz (1994), p. 122]
Figure 1: Positive feedbacks between output and innovative search (in levels): short-run (A) and long-
run (B) effects of recessions. Source Stiglitz (1994), p. 123.
Despite the 2008 crisis, many economists continue to believe in some version of the model
underlying the example A in Figure 1: the economy is bound to spring back, with no permanent
5See Dosi and Virgillito (2016) for a further discussion.
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loss to its long-run equilibrium rate of growth. The econometric side of this belief is the Frisch-
like idea of the economy as a “pendulum”, responding to exogenous shocks.6 In this perspective,
it seems almost a “miracle” that in the empirical literature one recently finds impulse response
functions with multipliers significantly grater than one. This, we suggest, is a witness of the
depth of the current crisis (see Blanchard and Leigh, 2013).
However, a small but significant minority of the profession has been forced by the evidence
to accept case B in Figure 1: recession-induced output losses are permanent because even if
the system goes back to the pre-crisis rate of growth, that is associated with an absolute level
gap exponentially growing over time. Moreover, as discussed in Stiglitz (1994), imperfect capital
markets and credit rationing may well exacerbate the effect of recessions, hampering the recovery
of the growth rate even further. Beyond that, recurrent negative demand shocks, such as those
deriving from austerity or labour market flexibilization policies, might yield reduced long-term
rates of growth: this is what is shown in Dosi et al. (2016) and Dosi et al. (2016). In the latter
scenario, as in the example in Figure 2, the pre- and post-crisis growth trajectories diverge,
implying a decaying long-run rate of the output growth.
Time
ln Q
Figure 2: Divergent growth trajectories and permanent losses in output growth rates.
2.2 Innovation, diffusion and investment
At the empirical level, a first microeconomic channel which might induce hysteresis is the lower
innovation rate associated with a reduction in the aggregate demand, which turns out in a
decline in the productivity growth. Indeed, R&D expenditures are pro-cyclical. Moreover, the
diffusion of new technologies and the adoption of capital-embodied, best-practice techniques
slows down during crises. Reifschneider et al. (2015) document a drop in the rate of growth
of R&D expenditure in the U.S. from 3.6 on average in the pre-crises period (1990-2007) to
1.6 percentage points after 2007. Not only the propensity to innovate, but also the process of
adoption and diffusion of innovation is slowed down by the contraction of aggregate demand.
Both phenomena have been emphasized long ago by Freeman et al. (1982) in their search for
the patterns and determinants of long term fluctuations in growth and employment, and, more
recently, theoretically investigated in Dosi et al. (2016, 2017).
6For an enticing reconstruction of the discussion between Frisch and Schumpeter on the “pendulum” metaphor,
see Louca (2001).
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Together with the slower rates of innovation, a process of destruction of the installed pro-
ductive capacity, due to the lack of sales prospects, seems markedly happening in the post-2008.
Indeed, even non-Keynesian commentators have identified the current economic crisis as one
stemming from the lack of aggregate demand. As the interest rate reached its zero lower bound
without fostering any surge in the investment rate, only accelerator-type investment processes
seem able to explain the deteriorating dynamics of the productive capacity. Consistently with
the accelerator hypothesis, Kothari et al. (2013) report that investments are ultimately affected
by the dynamics of sales, rather than by the interest rate. According to their estimates, of
the 23% total drop in investment during 2008-2009, “more than three-quarters (18.1%) can be
explained by the drop in GDP and corporate profits in the fourth quarter of 2008” [ibid, p. 6].
Lower innovation, diffusion and investment rates seem very plausible candidates to explain the
current slowdown in productivity.
In turn, the fundamental point is that such changes may well bear a long-term impact, that
is hysteretic effects, on the future dynamics of productivity, GDP and employment.
2.3 Entry dynamics
The second microeconomic channel is the declining firm entry rate, which has been recently
investigated especially in the U.S., as discussed in Gourio et al. (2014). Entry rates have started
to decline since 2006 by about 27%, a widespread phenomenon across all sectors of the economy.
This has been accompanied by steady exit rates and, consequently, also shrinking net entry
rates. One direct effect of less entry is the reduced creation of new job opportunities. Decker
et al. (2016) document a long term pattern in declining business dynamism which the authors
attribute, mainly, to the contracting share of young firms. In a similar vein, Siemer (2014)
introduces the hypothesis of a “missing generation” of entrants, as the results of the tightening
financial constraints, primarily affecting young firms. According to his estimates, the latter,
characterised by a high financial dependence, were responsible for a reduction in the rates of
job creation between 4.8 to 10.5 percentages relative to large, non-financially constrained firms.
In fact, constrained access to credit may represent an important barrier to entry, together with
the usual set-up costs, particularly during crises and the associated tight finance availability. In
a Minskian perspective, on the other hand, periods of easy access to debt may induce a higher
entry rate. Kerr and Nanda (2009), study the effect of the banking deregulation in the U.S.
upon the entry rate from the 1970s, and estimate an increase of 10% in the start-ups rate after
the reforms. Similar findings have been reported by Bertrand et al. (2007) at the industry level
for France.
All in all, both in relatively bad or good times, the entry dynamics, affected by credit and
other conditions, seems to be a potential, relevant, source of hysteresis.
2.4 Skills deterioration
A third microeconomic channel which might trigger hysteresis is the skills deterioration process.
Once the economy enters a longer recessionary phase, firms tend to fire workers. During severe
recessions, like the 2008 ongoing crisis, the ability of firms to hire is significantly weakened, so
unemployment which could be in principle temporary and cyclical, turns out to be persistent,
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implying that many workers experience long unemployment spells. Unemployed workers, as they
stop learning-by-doing and lose contact with the new practices and techniques being introduced
by firms, gradually deteriorate their existing skills over the unemployment period. As the econ-
omy recovers and the unemployed are finally hired, their productivity is lower than incumbent
workers, reducing the overall productivity.
Looking at the recent figures, Reifschneider et al. (2015) document that people who have been
unemployed more than 26 weeks peaked at 45% in 2011 and it was still about 30% in 2013. On
a similar vein, Jaimovich and Siu (2012) analyse the speed of economic recovery during different
economic recessions (1970, 1975, 1982, 1991, 2001, 2009) in the United States. Their findings
suggest that while in the first three recessions aggregate employment begun to expand within
six months of the peak of the downturn, during the last three crises employment continued to
contract for about 20 months before turning around. Yet, at the end of 2013 employment had not
returned to the pre-crisis level. Finally, Abraham et al. (2016) studying the effect of long-term
unemployment on employment probability and earnings find evidence that long unemployment
duration is negatively associated with both job-finding rates and earning opportunities. On a
similar vein, Ghayad (2013), on the basis of a re´sume´ review study, reports that employers have
a strong rejection for long-term unemployed applicants, even in case of equivalent or superior
re´sume´ qualification.
Hence, the effects of long unemployment shocks upon skills and job-finding probabilities are
yet another important candidate as a source of macroeconomic hysteresis.
3 The model
We build a general disequilibrium, stock-and-flow consistent agent-based model, populated by
heterogeneous firms and workers, who behave according to bounded-rational rules. More specif-
ically, we extend the Keynes Meets Schumpeter (K+S) model (Dosi et al., 2010) with decentral-
ized interactions among firms and workers in both the product and the labour markets (Dosi
et al., 2016, 2017), introducing an endogenous process of workers’ skills accumulation and vari-
able number of firms.
The two-sector economy is composed of three populations of heterogeneous agents, F 1t
capital-good firms (denoted by the subscript i), F 2t consumption-good firms (denoted by the
subscript j), LS consumers/workers (denoted by the subscript `), plus a bank and the Govern-
ment. The basic structure of the model is depicted in Figure 3. Capital-good firms invest in
R&D and produce heterogeneous machine-tools whose productivity stochastically evolves over
time. Consumption-good firms combine machines bought from capital-good firms and labour in
order to produce an homogeneous product for consumers. There is a minimal financial system
represented by a single bank that provides credit to firms to finance production and investment
plans. Workers submit job applications to a subset of the firms. Firms hire according to their
individual adaptive demand expectations. The government levies taxes on firms, pays unem-
ployment benefits and set minimum wages, according to the policy setting, absorbing excess
profits and losses from the bank and keeping a relatively balanced budget in the long run.
In the following, we first summarize the functioning of the capital- and the consumption-good
sectors of our economy, with a focus on the entry process, and then present the labour market
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Figure 3: The model structure. Boxes in bold style represent heterogeneous agents populations.
dynamics, detailing the skills accumulation and deterioration mechanisms. Finally, we describe
the two alternative policy regime settings (and variations thereof) under which the model has
been explored. In Appendix A, we briefly discuss the firms’, the workers’ and the Government
behavioural rules (for details, see also Dosi et al., 2010 and Dosi et al., 2017). The model main
variables, its configuration and the parameter set-up are presented in Appendix B.
3.1 The capital- and consumption-good sectors
The capital-good industry is the locus where innovation is endogenously generated in the econ-
omy. Capital-good firms develop new machine-embodied techniques or imitate the ones of their
competitors in order to produce and sell more productive and cheaper machinery, supplied on
order to consumption-good firms. The capital-good market is characterized by imperfect infor-
mation and Schumpeterian competition driven by technological innovation. Machine-tool firms
signal the price and productivity of their machines to their existing customers as well to a subset
of potential new ones and invest a fraction of past revenues in R&D aimed at searching for new
machines or copy existing ones. On order, they produce machine-tools with labour only. Prices
are set using a fixed mark-up over unit (labour) costs of production.
Consumption-good firms produce an homogeneous good employing capital (composed by
different “vintages” of machines) and labour under constant returns to scale. Desired production
is determined according to adaptive demand expectations. Given the actual inventories, if the
capital stock is not sufficient to produce the desired output, firms order new machines to expand
their installed capacity, paying in advance – drawing on their cash flows or, up to some limit,
on bank credit. Moreover, they replace old machines according to a payback-period rule. As
new machines embed state-of-the-art technologies, the labour productivity of consumption-good
firms increases over time according to the mix of vintages of machines present in their capital
stocks. Consumption-good firms choose in every period their capital-good supplier comparing
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the price and the productivity of the machines they are aware of. Firms then fix their prices
applying a variable mark-up rule on their production costs, trying to balance higher profits
and the growth of market shares. More specifically, firms increase their mark-up and price
whenever their market share is expanding and vice versa. Imperfect information is also the
normal state of the consumption-good market so consumers do not instantaneously switch to
the most competitive producer. Market shares evolve according to a (quasi) replicator dynamics:
more competitive firms expand, while firms with relatively lower competitiveness levels shrink,
or exit the market.
3.2 The entry and exit process
We expand the K+S model accounting for a variable number of firms in both consumption- and
capital-good sectors (F 1t , F
2
t ). In the extended version of the model, entry and exit are now
independent processes. Firms leave the market whenever their market shares get close to zero
or their net assets turn negative (bankruptcy).
In line with Dosi et al. (1995), we define the number of entrants by the random variables b1t
and b2t , for the capital- and the consumption-good sectors, respectively:
bzt = max
(
F zt−1 [(1− o)MAzt + opizt ] , 0
)
(1)
where z ∈ {1, 2} denotes the sector (capital- or consumption-good, respectively), F zt−1 is the
existing number of firms, 1 ≤ o ≤ 1 is a parameter and pizt is a random draw from a uniform
distribution on the fixed support [
¯
x2, x¯2], representing a stochastic component in the entry
process. MAzt is the market-specific entry attractiveness in period t, defined as:
MAzt = MC
z
t −MCzt−1, bounded to [¯x2, x¯2]. (2)
MCzt represents the overall sector’s financial conditions, represented by the aggregated firms’
balance sheet situation, calculated over the individual stocks of liquid assets NWy,t and bank
debt Deby,t in each sector (y ∈ {i, j}, accordingly):
MCzt = log
(∑
y
NWy,t−1
)
− log
(∑
y
Deby,t−1
)
. (3)
So, MCzt measures the overall sectoral ratio between liquid assets and debt, and thus the tight-
ness of the credit market. Negative (positive) values of MAzt represent leveraged (delevaraged)
markets.
The adopted formulation of the entry process tries to model some well known facts in the
industrial dynamics and business cycle literature: (i) the number of entrants is proportional to
the number of incumbent firms (Geroski, 1991, 1995), (ii) entry is affected by the easiness of
access to credit (Kerr and Nanda, 2009; Bertrand et al., 2007), (iii) the process is pro-cyclical
(Gomis et al., 2017; Lee and Mukoyama, 2015).
3.3 The labour market and skills dynamics
The labour market in the model implements a decentralized search and hiring process between
workers and firms (more on that in Dosi et al., 2016, 2017). The aggregate supply of labour
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LS is fixed and all workers are available to be hired in any period. Also the labour market is
characterised by imperfect information. When unemployed, workers submit a certain number
of job applications to firms. Employed workers may apply or not for better positions, according
to the institutional set-up (see Section ?? below). Larger firms, in terms of market share,
have a proportionally higher probability of receiving workers applications, which are organized
in separated, firm-specific queues. Firms decide their individual labour demand based on the
received orders (capital-good sector), the expected demand (consumption-good sector), and the
current labour productivity level. Considering the number and the productivity of the already
employed workers, firms decide to (i) hire new workers, (ii) fire part of the existing ones, or (iii)
keep the existing labour force. Hiring firms define a wage offer for the applicant workers, based
on their internal conditions and their received applications. Workers select the best offer they
get from the firms to which they submitted applications, if any. If already employed, they quit
the current job if a better wage offer is received. There is no second round of bargaining between
workers and firms during the same time period and, so, firms have no guarantee of fulfilling all
the open positions (no market clearing). Moreover, there are no firing or hiring transaction
costs.
We extend the K+S model to account for the process of workers’ skills accumulation and
deterioration. Such a process is driven by worker-specific job tenures. The skill level s`,t > 0 of
each worker ` evolves over time as a multiplicative process:
s`,t =
(1 + τ)s`,t−1 if employed in t− 11
1 + τ
s`,t−1 if unemployed in t− 1.
(4)
with τ ≥ 0 a parameter. As a consequence, when worker ` is employed her skills improve over
time, as she becomes more experienced in her task. Conversely, unemployed workers lose skills.
In particular, when a worker is hired, she may immediately acquire the minimum level of skills
already present in the firm (the existing worker with the lowest skills), if above her present level.
Also, workers have a fixed working life. After a fixed number of periods Tr ∈ N∗ in the labour
market, workers retire and are replaced by younger ones,7 whose skills are equivalent to the
current minimum firm incumbent level.
Workers’ skills define their individual (potential) productivity A`,t:
A`,t =
s`,t
s¯t
Aτi , s¯t =
1
LS
∑
`
s`,t, (5)
where s¯t is the average workers skills level and A
τ
i , the productivity of the machinery vintage the
worker operates. The ratio s`,t/s¯t, or the worker normalized productivity, represents her ability
to produce more (if s`,t > s¯t) or less (otherwise) when using a certain machine technology, in
relation to the “normal” vintage productivity. The worker effective production depends, yet,
on its utilization in the production process, according to the firms desired production level
Qdj,t. Note that the aggregation over firm-level productivities Aj,t is a truly emergent properties
of the model, resulting, simultaneously, from the technical innovation dynamics (mainly, the
7In the start of the simulation, initial workers ages are randomly draw in the integer range [1, Tr] and all start
from the same skills level.
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introduction of new vintages Aτi ), the worker skills accumulation/deterioration process and the
effective demand, which guides firms when deciding Qdj,t (see Appendix A for more details).
The influence of workers skills upon production reflects a learning by tenure/doing mechanism
well established in the literature at least since the seminal contribution of Arrow (1962). On the
empirical side, for the links between tenure, capability accumulation and firm productivity, see
Zhou et al. (2011) and Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2009), among others.
3.4 Timeline of events
In each simulation time step, firms and workers behavioural rules are applied according to the
following timeline:
1. Machines ordered in the previous period (if any) are delivered;
2. Capital-good firms perform R&D and signal their machines to consumption-good firms;
3. Consumption-good firms decide on how much to produce, invest and hire/fire;
4. To fulfil production and investment plans, firms allocate cash-flows and (if needed) borrow
from bank;
5. Firms send/receive machine-tool orders for the next period (if applicable);
6. Workers (employed and unemployed) update their own skills;
7. Firms open job queues and job-seekers send applications to them (“queue”);
8. Wages are set (indexation or bargaining) and job vacancies are partly or totally filled;
9. Government collects taxes and pays unemployment subsidies;
10. Consumption-good market opens and the market shares of firms evolve according to com-
petitiveness;
11. Firms in both sectors compute their profits, pay wages and repay debt;
12. Exit takes place, firms with near-zero market share or negative net assets are eschewed
from the market;
13. Prospective entrants decide to enter according to the markets conditions;
14. Aggregate variables are computed and the cycle restarts.
3.5 Alternative labour-market policy regimes
We employ the model described above to study two alternative policy regimes, which we call
Fordist (our baseline) and Competitive.8 The policy regimes are telegraphically sketched in
Table 1.
Under the Fordist regime, wages are insensitive to the labour market conditions and indexed
to the productivity gains of the firms. There is a sort of covenant between firms and workers
concerning “long term” employment: firms fire only when their profits become negative, while
workers are loyal to employers and do not seek for alternative jobs. When hiring/firing, firms
8The two regimes capture alternative wage-labour nexus in the words of the Regulation Theory (see, within a
vast literature, Boyer and Saillard, 2005 and Amable, 2003).
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aim to keep the more skilled workers. Labour market institutions contemplate a minimum wage
fully indexed to aggregated economy productivity and unemployment benefits financed by taxes
on profits. Conversely, in the Competitive regime, flexible wages respond to unemployment and
decentralised market dynamics, and are set by means of an asymmetric bargaining process where
firms have the last say. Employed workers search for better paid jobs with some positive proba-
bility and firms freely adjust (fire) their excess workforce according to their planned production.
Hiring/firing workers by firms are based on a balance between skills and wages, using a simple
payback comparison rule. The Competitive regime is also characterized by different labour in-
stitutions: minimum wage is only partially indexed to productivity and unemployment benefits
– and the associated taxes on profits – are relatively lower.
The simulation exercises in Section 5 are configured so that there is a regime transition at a
certain time step, capturing a set of labour-market “structural reforms”. This institutional shock
is meant to spur flexibility on the relations among agents in the labour market and implies that
the social compromise embodied in the Fordist regime is replace by the Competitive one.
Fordist (baseline) Competitive
Wage sensitivity to unemployment low (rigid) high (flexible)
Workers search activity unemployed only unemployed and employed
Labour firing restrictions under losses only none
Workers hiring priority higher skills lower payback
Workers firing priority lower skills higher payback
Unemployment benefits yes yes (reduced)
Minimum wage productivity indexation full partial
Table 1: Main characteristics of tested policy regimes.
4 Empirical validation
The K+S model is able to generate endogenous growth and business cycles, emergent crises,
and to reproduce a rich set of macro (e.g., relative volatility, co-movements, etc.) and micro
(firm size distributions, firm productivity dynamics, etc.) stylized facts (see Dosi et al., 2010,
2013, 2015, 2017). The detailed list of empirical regularities matched by the model is reported in
Table 2. In addition, the labour-enhanced version of the model (Dosi et al., 2016, 2017), which
explicitly accounts for microeconomic firm-worker interactions, has already proved to be able to
robustly reproduce most of the labour market macro empirical regularities (cf. the bottom part
of Table 2).
Such extensive ensemble of stylized facts is also replicated by the current version of the
model. Moreover, the introduction of skill dynamics and variable number of firms allow to
match new empirical regularities. Pro-cyclical entry and heterogeneous skill distribution are
emergent properties generated by the model (cf. Table 2).
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Microeconomic Stylized Facts Aggregate-level Stylized Facts
Skewed firm size distributions Endogenous self-sustained growth
with persistent fluctuations
Fat-tailed firm growth rates distributions Fat-tailed GDP growth rate distribution
Heterogeneous productivity across firms Endogenous volatility of GDP,
consumption and investment
Persistent productivity differentials Cross-correlation of macro variables
Lumpy investment rates of firms Pro-cyclical aggregate R&D investment
and net entry of firms in the market
Heterogeneous skills distribution Persistent and counter-cyclical unemployment
Fat-tailed unemployment time distribution Endogenous volatility of productivity,
unemployment, vacancy, separation and
hiring rates
Unemployment and inequality correlation
Pro-cyclical workers skills accumulation
Beveridge curve
Okun curve
Wage curve
Matching function
Table 2: Stylized facts matched by the K+S model at different aggregation levels.
5 At the roots of hysteresis
Let us study the emergence of hysteresis in our model, addressing the possible causes and
discussing the consequences for the economic dynamics. We will first study inter-regime long-
run hysteresis (cf. Figure 2), also testing the Blanchard-Summers hypothesis (Section 5.1). We
will then analyse the emergence of intra-regime (transient) hysteresis (Section 5.2).
5.1 Regime change: asymptotic hysteresis
We begin with the long-run dynamics of the model, when affected by an institutional shock,
namely the introduction of “structural reforms” aimed at increasing the flexibility of the labour
market, leaving however untouched the technological fundamentals. In our policy typology, the
reforms are supposed to move the labour market regime from a Fordist to a Competitve set-
up (see Section 3.5 above). In that, we are implicitly testing the insider-outsider theory of
hysteresis proposed by Blanchard and Summers (1987). The implication of the latter analysis
in normative terms is the advocacy of a more flexible labour market, where unions have lower
bargaining power in the wage formation process, with the aim of making wages more respondent
to unemployment conditions. In our model, the transition from a Fordist toward a Competitive
type of labour relations well captures such structural reforms, aimed at achieving both numerical
(easier firing) and wage flexibility (wages more respondent to unemployment), as illustrated in
Table 1.
In Figure 4, we report the time series of the main macroeconomic variables in the two
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regimes.9 The institutional shock occurs at time t = 100 (the vertical dotted line). The widening
GDP gap between the two regimes, as presented in Figure 4.a, shows how the structural reforms
determine not only super-hysteresis (i.e., a permanently lower growth rate of the GDP), but
even asymptotic hysteresis, whereby the effects propagate in the very long-run (see also Dosi
et al., 2017, 2016). The actual level of the long-run capacity utilization increases from the 85%
to 90% after the introduction of the Competitive regime (cf. Figure 4.b), hinting at a process of
underinvestment due to the worsened business opportunities for firms. The capital accumulation
is slower when structural reforms are in place: the growth rate falls from 1.55% to 1.44% per
period. Figure 4.c shows the dynamics of unemployment and vacancy rates, which are negatively
correlated, consistently with the Beveridge Curve, while unemployment is significantly higher in
the Competitive regime. The negative effects of structural reforms spill over the long-run: the
number of successful innovations in the capital-good sector takes a sustained lower trajectory
(Figure 4.d) and the average level of workers skills is significantly reduced (Figure 4.e). Finally,
the trend of net entry of firms in the market is more volatile after the reforms, indicating a
higher level of volatility in credit conditions (Figure 4.f).10
The different performance of the two regimes is quantitatively summarised in Table 3, which
presents the averages and the ratios between selected variables of the two set-ups and also the
p-values for a t test comparing the averages. The results confirm, at a 5% significance level, that
after the introduction of structural reforms the short- and long-run performance of the economy
significantly worsens. Note that as the technological configuration of the model is invariant
between the two regime specifications, the significant effects on the productivity, innovation and
imitation rates are entirely caused by the institutional shock.11
What are the drivers of the soaring asymptotic hysteresis in the model? The huge surge in
unemployment reflects the widening gap between the long-run dynamics of real wages in the
two regimes,12 which, in turn, leads to the emergence of Keynesian unemployment due to the
contraction of aggregate demand and the slowdown on the aggregate skills accumulation and
on the productivity growth. Figure 5 shows the box-plot comparison between the Monte Carlo
simulation runs for the two regimes, for the long-term consequences in terms of the innovation
and imitation rates, productivity growth, job tenure, workers skills and net entry of firms (see
Section 2). The results in the first row of plots (Figure 5.a, b and c) indicate a reduction in the
innovation and imitation rates in the majority of the simulation runs – the latter variables are
calculated as the rate of successful innovators and imitators in the capital-good sector – and,
as a consequence, in the productivity growth rate. This is an indirect outcome of the fall in
the aggregate demand, which yields lower R&D expenditure by firms.13 In the same direction,
9The presented series are the averages of 50 Monte Carlo simulation runs, over 500 periods. The initial 100
“warm-up” periods are not presented.
10As discussed in Section ??, entry decision in the model is also driven by the average financial conditions of
the firms in each sector.
11In accordance with the behavioural rules set in the model (cf. Appendix A), the dynamics of innovation, of
imitation, of new machines introduction and, consequently, of the firms productivity growth is directly affected by
the overall macroeconomic conditions, including those directly impacted by the reforms. This creates a (potentially
hysteretic) reinforcing feedback process between the macro and the technological domains, which in part explains
the observed results.
12The real wages growth rates are 1.47% and 1.35% per period, respectively.
13See Appendix A for details on the innovation process.
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the results in the second row of Figure 5 show the quite significant fall on the average tenure
period (plot d) and the ensuing slower pace of the workers skills accumulation (plot e), which, in
turn, also has a direct and negative effect on the growth of productivity. Finally, the increased
net entry (number of entrants minus the exiting firms) after the structural reforms (plot f) is
due to the more lenient credit conditions: however, such an increase in the entry rates do not
compensate at all the foregoing negative effects of the institutional shocks.
The transmission channels in the model operate through both numerical and wage flexibility.
First, higher numerical flexibility, where workers are freely fired, determines a sharp drop in
workers job tenure and, indirectly, has a negative effect on skills accumulation and, consequently,
on productivity. Not only the firing rule, but also the firing criteria affect the dynamics of
productivity growth. In the Fordist regime, firms hire (fire) first workers with higher (lower)
skills.14 Conversely, in the Competitive case, firms use the skills-to-wage “payback” ratios as a
decision guide to preferentially hire (fire) workers with superior (inferior) payback ratios. Such
a behaviour has a negative impact on the average skills level of the incumbent workers over
time. On the other hand, higher wage flexibility, by limiting the wage indexation upon the
productivity gains, causes a straight-forward drop in the aggregate demand via the reduced
consumption of workers. In turn, the shrinking sales opportunities drive a fall in investment
and labour demand, which induces more unemployment, characterising a typical Keynesian
amplified-feedback downturn. Moreover, the slower economy also impacts upon the entry/exit
and the innovation/imitation rates, via the overall cut in total R&D expenditure and the higher
volatility in the number of operating firms. In fact, Figure 6 shows the significant level of
correlation between the business cycle and the net entry of firms in the markets.
The severe effects of asymptotic hysteresis are particularly well illustrated by the probability
distributions for the time unemployed workers need to find a new job, presented in Figure 7.15 As
shown by the huge increase in the distribution support, long-term unemployment is substantially
higher in the Competitive case.16
To sum up, our simulation experiments on the K+S model – extended with endogenous firms
entry and workers skills accumulation/deterioration – generically yield asymptotic hysteresis
stemming from an institutional shock. Indeed, institutions are a “carrier of history” (David,
1994). However, contrary to the insider-outsider hypothesis (Blanchard and Summers, 1987)
“pro-market” institutions bear a negative hysteretic effect. However, our results seem to provide
a more consistent explanation for its main causes and also bring a critical warning. The model
suggests that structural reforms aimed at increasing the flexibility in the labour market, may
well spur even more hysteresis instead of reducing it. Given that, in the next section, we focus
on intra-regime hysteresis phenomena.
14This is a necessary consequence of the firms unilaterally decided and homogeneously applied wage adjustments,
so skills are the only heterogeneous metric among workers in a Fordist firm.
15Note the log scale in the y axis
16The maximum notional unemployment time is 120 periods, equivalent to the working life in the model (pa-
rameter Tr).
16
Figure 4: Macroeconomic dynamics in alternative policy regimes.
Lines represent 50 MC runs time step averages.
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Time series Fordist (1) Competitive (2) Ratio (2)/(1) p-value
GDP growth rate 0.0148 0.0135 0.9118 0.044
Capacity utilization 0.8712 0.9038 1.0374 0.000
Productivity growth rate 0.0147 0.0134 0.9084 0.034
Innovation rate 0.0937 0.0719 0.7677 0.001
Imitation rate 0.0253 0.0189 0.7476 0.004
Unemployment rate 0.0152 0.2640 17.400 0.000
Vacancy rate 0.0976 0.1439 1.4749 0.000
Worker tenure 27.861 4.9561 0.1779 0.000
Worker skills 1.7288 1.3418 0.7762 0.000
Wages std. deviation 0.0618 0.1710 2.7672 0.000
Table 3: Comparison between policy regimes: selected time series averages. Averages for 50 MC runs in
period [200, 400] (excluding warm-up). P-value for a two means t test, H0: no difference between regimes.
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Figure 5: Performance comparison between policy regimes.
Summary statistics for 50 MC runs in period [200, 400] (excluding warm-up). Bar: median | box: 2nd-3rd quartile | whiskers: max-min | dots: outliers.
(a) Innovation rate
Fordist Competitive
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
6
0
.
0
8
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
2
0
.
1
4
0
.
1
6
Innovation
( bar: median / box: 2nd−3rd quartile / whiskers: max−min / points: outliers / MC runs = 50 / period = 300 − 500 )
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
n
g
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
1
(b) Imitation rate
l
Fordist Competitive
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
1
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
3
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
5
Imitation
( bar: median / box: 2nd−3rd quartile / whiskers: max−min / points: outliers / MC runs = 50 / period = 300 − 500 )
I
m
i
t
a
t
i
n
g
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
1
(c) Productivity growth rate
l
l
l
l
Fordist Competitive
0
.
0
0
5
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
5
0
.
0
2
0
Productivity growth
( bar: median / box: 2nd−3rd quartile / whiskers: max−min / points: outliers / MC runs = 50 / period = 300 − 500 )
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
(d) Worker tenure
l
l
Fordist Competitive
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
Workers tenure
( bar: median / box: 2nd−3rd quartile / whiskers: max−min / points: outliers / MC runs = 50 / period = 300 − 500 )
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
i
n
 
s
a
m
e
 
f
i
r
m
 
(
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
)
(e) Worker skills
l
l
Fordist Competitive
1
.
3
1
.
4
1
.
5
1
.
6
1
.
7
1
.
8
Workers tenure skills
( bar: median / box: 2nd−3rd quartile / whiskers: max−min / points: outliers / MC runs = 50 / period = 300 − 500 )
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
s
k
i
l
l
s
 
l
e
v
e
l
(f) Net entry of firms
Fordist Competitive
−
0
.
4
−
0
.
2
0
.
0
0
.
2
0
.
4
0
.
6
Net entry of firms
( bar: median / box: 2nd−3rd quartile / whiskers: max−min / points: outliers / MC runs = 50 / period = 300 − 500 )
N
e
t
 
e
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
b
o
t
h
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
19
Figure 6: Firms net entry dynamics and the business cycle (Competitive regime).
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5.2 Detecting intra-regime hysteresis
Assessing the emergence of intra-regime hysteresis is not a trivial task as there is no unifying test
or even widely accepted criteria for this. However, there are several properties and techniques
which do help to uncover particular aspects of hysteresis. In the following, we present a set of
analytical methods, summarized in Table 4, which provide evidence of the presence of hysteretical
properties in the K+S model. In line with the literature, we study whether the time series
generated by the model present evidence of (i) remanence, (ii) super-hysteresis, (iii) persistency,
(iv) nonlinearity, and (v) path-dependency. Needless to say, the properties are to some degree
overlapping.
Figure 8 illustrates the number of periods (grey area) necessary to put the economy back to
the pre-crisis growth trend (dashed line) in typical simulation runs.17 The analysis is inspired
by (Blanchard et al., 2015) and simply performs an extrapolation of the long-run GDP trend to
detect the recovery from crises under the presence of hysteresis. The results show the coexistence
of shorter business cycle downturns with more hysteretical crises, requiring significant longer
times for the economy to recover. Note also the presence of transient super hysteresis revealed
by the different slopes of the peak to to peak GDP trend (dashed lines).
Table 5 reports the average recovery duration for both the GDP and the mean unemployment
time (the average period a worker takes to find a new job). While the duration of the GDP
trend recovery is similar among regimes (around 16 periods), the mean unemployment time takes
almost five times more to return to its pre-crisis level in the Competitive case. In order to better
assess the severity of the crises, we also track the peak GDP trend deviation during the recovery
period (the further the GDP gets from the pre-crisis trend) and the accumulated GDP losses in
comparison to the trend (the crisis total “cost”). The model robustly shows how Competitive
regime crises are about two times deeper than in the Fordist scenario. The accumulated GDP
losses comparison leads to a similar conclusion.
17A crisis is defined by a 3% drop of the GDP in a single period which is not recovered in the next three periods.
The pre-crisis level is calculated as the average GDP for the four periods before the crisis and the trend, as the
output of an HP filter at the period just before the crisis. The crisis is considered recovered when the GDP reaches
back the pre-crisis trend.
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Figure 7: Probability distribution of worker unemployment time.
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Property Test Reference
Remanence Duration of recovery of Jaimovich and Siu, 2012
employment and GDP after crises
Super-hysteresis Different GDP growth trend (slope) after crises Blanchard et al., 2015
Persistency Unit-root tests for stationarity Blanchard and Summers, 1986
Nonlinearity Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman test Broock et al., 1996
Path dependence Ergodicity tests Wald and Wolfowitz, 1940
Table 4: Selected tests to evaluate hysteretic properties in times series.
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Figure 8: GDP recovery after crises.
Typical simulation runs. Dashed line: pre-crisis trends | Gray boxes: recovery periods.
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Fordist Competitive
Number of crises 6.15 5.77
(0.44) (0.28)
Crises peak 0.23 0.51
(0.01) (0.02)
Crises losses 2.38 4.18
(0.33) (0.42)
Recovery duration
- GDP 15.64 16.97
(1.43) (1.04)
- Unemployment time 6.83 31.22
(0.55) (9.04)
Table 5: Comparison between policy regimes: GDP and unemployment time recovery.
Averages for 50 MC runs in period [200, 400] (excluding warm-up), MC standard errors in parentheses.
In Table 6, we report a set of statistical tests to detect unit-roots/stationarity (Augmented
Dickey-Fuller ADF, Phillips-Perron PP, and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin KPSS tests),
i.i.d./nonlinearity (Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman BDS test), and ergodicity (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
KS and Wald-Wolfowitz WW tests).18 Except for the WW case, the tests are applied for
individual Monte Carlo simulation runs (or multiple run pairs combinations, in the case of KS)
and, so, the results present the frequency of the rejection of the null hypothesis for the set of 50
runs at the usual 5% significance level (see Table 6 for the definition of H0 in each case).
The results of the tests suggest that GDP, productivity and wage growth rates more fre-
quently exhibit stationary (no unit-roots) behaviour in both regimes. More borderline, the
unemployment rate time series seems to be more commonly stationary among simulation runs
in the Fordist regime, while more likely non-stationary in the Competitive one. The nonlinearity
test indicates a more nuanced situation: the unemployment series is the one more frequently
nonlinear (not i.i.d), particularly in the Competitive regime, while the wage growth rates series
are more likely linear/i.i.d. Finally, the less powerful KS cannot reject ergodicity for the majority
of run pairs tested, while WW indicates the non-ergodicity of all series.
There are few take-home messages from the tests. The first is that mixed results on e.g.
ergodicity or stationarity militate in favour of path-dependency. In fact, they show the different
statistical properties of alternative sample-paths: only an outright acceptance of the null hy-
pothesis could be claimed in support of the the lack of hysteresis. Second, but related, the tests
aimed at the detection of some underlying, emergent, non-linear structure, are quite encouraging
despite the limited length of the sample paths.
We performed a global sensitivity analysis (SA) to explore the effects of alternative model
parametrisations and to gain further insights on the robustness of our exercises on institutional
shocks.19 Out of the 57 parameters and initial conditions in the model, we reduce the relevant
parametric dimensionality to 29, by means of an Elementary Effect screening procedure which
allowed discarding from the analysis the parameters which do not significantly affect the selected
18We report alternative tests for each property because of possible lack of power in some circumstances.
19For technical details on the methodology, see Dosi et al. (2016).
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Fordist ADF PP KPSS BDS KS WW
GDP growth rate 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.30 0.23 0.00
Productivity growth rate 0.76 1.00 0.02 0.44 0.12 0.00
Wage growth rate 0.60 1.00 0.12 0.16 0.40 0.00
Unemployment rate 0.40 0.60 0.16 0.50 0.33 0.01
Competitive ADF PP KPSS BDS KS WW
GDP growth rate 0.54 0.98 0.00 0.42 0.11 0.00
Productivity growth rate 0.64 1.00 0.02 0.62 0.19 0.00
Wage growth rate 0.42 1.00 0.14 0.30 0.38 0.02
Unemployment rate 0.24 0.00 0.26 1.00 0.49 0.00
Table 6: Comparison between policy regimes: statistical tests for detecting hysteresis.
Frequencies of rejection of H0 for 50 MC runs in period [300, 350] (excluding warm-up)
except for WW test (p-value presented), at 5% significance.
ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller)/PP (Phillips-Perron) H0: non-stationary | KPSS (Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin) H0: stationary | BDS (Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman) H0: i.i.d., KS (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov)/WW (Wald-Wolfowitz) H0: ergodic.
model outputs.20 All the parameters tested in the SA, their “calibration” values, as well the tests
statistics, are detailed in Table 7 (Appendix B). In order to understand the effect of each of the
29 parameters over the selected metrics, we perform a Sobol decomposition.21 Because of the
relatively high computational costs to produce the decomposition using the original model, a
simplified version of it – a meta-model – was build using the Kriging method and employed for
the Sobol SA.22 The meta-model is estimated by numerical maximum likelihood using a set of
observations (from the original model) sampled using a high-efficiency, nearly-orthogonal Latin
hypercube design of experiments (Cioppa and Lucas, 2007).
The main indicator used for the SA is the accumulated GDP losses during the crises’ recovery
periods, as defined above. It seems a sensible choice, as it conveys information about both
the duration and the intensity of the crises, as such among the key properties of hysteresis.
Interestingly, this indicator is significantly influenced only by a limited set of parameters (and no
initial condition), namely the learning rate parameter (τ), the retirement age (Tr), the replicator
equation parameter (χ), the maximum technical advantage of the capital-good entrants (x5), and
the minimum capital ratio (Φ1) and the expected capacity utilization (u) of the consumption-
20Briefly, the Elementary Effects technique proposes both a specific design of experiments, to efficiently sample
the parameter space under a one-factor-at-a-time, and some linear regression statistics, to evaluate direct and
indirect (nonlinear/non-additive) effects of parameters on the model results (Morris, 1991, Saltelli et al., 2008).
21The Sobol decomposition is a variance-based, global SA method consisting in the decomposition of the variance
of the chosen model output into fractions according to the variances of the parameters selected for analysis,
better dealing with nonlinearities and non-additive interactions than traditional local SA methods. It allows to
disentangle both direct and interaction quantitative effects of the parameters on the chosen metrics (Sobol, 1993,
Saltelli et al., 2008).
22In summary, the Kriging meta-model “mimics” our original model by a simpler, mathematically-tractable
approximation. Kriging is an interpolation method that under fairly general assumptions provides the best linear
unbiased predictors for the response of complex, non-linear computer simulation models (Rasmussen and Williams,
2006, Salle and Yildizoglu, 2014).
24
Figure 9: Global sensitivity analysis: response surfaces.
Surfaces modelled using the fitted Kriging meta-model. z axis: recovery losses (rec loss).
Red dot: calibration settings | Markers: maximum (blue) and minimum (green) predicted crises losses.
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good entrants.23 The two parameters associated with the skills accumulation process, learning
rate (τ) and retirement age (Tr), are jointly responsible for almost 80% of the variance of the
losses indicator over the entire parametric space in both policy regimes.24
Figure 9.a and 9.b presents an exploration of the model response surface, using the Kriging
meta-model, for the two critical skills-related parameters. The rugged surfaces, in particular in
the Competitive regime, clearly indicate the nonlinear nature of the system, in tune with the
requirements for hysteretic behaviours. The sensitivity analysis of the model seems to suggest
that the parameters prominently influencing in their changes the level of hysteresis observed in
the losses indicator time series are those connected with the workers skills accumulation process
(τ and Tr), the firm entry mechanism (Φ1, u and x5) and the market competitiveness (χ).
Directly or in interaction among them, these 5 parameters account for 95% of the variation of
the GDP crises losses in the model for the two scenarios. This ensures that the comparisons
between policy regimes presented above are not influenced by specific configuration settings. As
can be seen in Figure 9, the Competitive regime tends to produce significant higher GDP crises
losses irrespective of the model set-up (notice that the peak losses in plot (a), the blue dot, are
at a lower z axis level than the deepest valley in plot (b), the green dot). Finally, the response
surfaces in both regimes show that in general the higher the learning rate (τ), the higher is the
accumulated GDP losses during the crises’ recovery periods. The latter positive marginal effect
hints at the fact that the higher the firm specific capabilities, the more difficult is to rebuilt the
firm skills destroyed by a crisis, and to be back to the pre-crisis level.
All in all, the statistical tests results indicate that model has a rather frequent tendency to
23All the equations and parameters are described in Sections 3.1 and 3.3 and in the Appendices.
24The parameters calibration values, valid ranges and the Sobol decomposition results are presented in Table 7
in Appendix B.
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produce runs which show the properties usually associated with hysteresis in its main variables,
in particular the unemployment rate, whenever hit by an endogenous-produced crisis. Recoveries
can take quite long times and the losses experienced by the economy, both in terms of the GDP
and the social cost of unemployment, severe. It is also significant that such losses seem to be
increased after the introduction of structural reforms of the type discussed above.
6 Conclusions
A revival of the debate on hysteresis has emerged in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
Together, the evidence forced a revisitation of the standard approach of modelling unit-root
processes as good candidates to explain the persistent deviation from the pre-crisis trends. Not
only the level trends of GDP and unemployment, but even the growth rates in many countries
are still persistently bellow the pre-2008 figures, leading to the importance of a strong notion of
hysteresis.
As an alternative, an expanding tradition of scholars have been discussing the notions of
hysteresis and path dependence, identifying in coordination failures and persistent effects of
aggregate demand upon productivity the main sources of potential long-term deviation from
stable growth trajectories. Nested into the latter literature, here we have presented an ABM
which intertwines a Schumpeterian engine of growth and a Keynesian generation of demand,
declined under two institutional labour-market variants, labelled as Fordist and Competitive
regimes. The transition from the Fordist to the Competitive regime also captures “structural
reforms” aimed at increasing labour market flexibility.
The model is able to generically exhibits path dependence, nonlinearity and non-ergodicity
in its main macroeconomic variables, presenting both inter-regime and intra-regime hysteresis
as a bottom-up emergent property. In a more specific instance, the model fails in providing
support to the Blanchard and Summers (1986) insider-outsider hypothesis, according to which
more flexible labour relations might reduce hysteresis. On the contrary, the model suggests that
both numerically and wage flexibility are quite prone to increase the hysteretic properties of the
macroeconomic system.
The K+S model leaves scope for many potential avenues for further research, addressing
the links between the functioning of the capital, good and labour markets. In particular, a
straightforward extension of the current paper would be the study of the effects of active labour
market policies, declined under alternative training programmes and hiring/firing schemes; yet
an other venue of research concerns the effect of hysteresis upon labour force participation.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Capital- and consumer-good sectors and technical change
The technology of capital-good firms is (Aτi , B
τ
i ). A
τ
i is the labour productivity of the machine-
tool manufactured by i for the consumption-good sector, while Bτi is the labour productivity
to produce the machine. Superscript τ denotes the technology vintage being produced/used.
Given the monetary average wage wi,t paid by firm i, the unit cost of production is:
ci,t =
wi,t
Bτi
. (6)
With a fixed mark-up µ1 ∈ R+ pricing rule, prices pi,t are defined as:
pi,t = (1 + µ1)ci,t. (7)
Firms in the capital-good industry “adaptively” strive to increase their market shares and
their profits trying to improve technology via innovation and imitation. Firms invest in R&D a
fraction ν ∈ (0, 1] of their past sales Si,t−1:
RDi,t = νSi,t−1. (8)
R&D activity is performed by workers exclusively devoted to this activity, whose demand is:
LR&Di,t =
RDi,t
wi,t
(9)
Firms split their R&D workers LR&Di,t between innovation (IN i,t) and imitation (IM i,t) activities
according to the parameter ξ ∈ [0, 1]:
INi,t = ξL
R&D
i,t (10)
IMi,t = (1− ξ)LR&Di,t . (11)
Innovation is a two-step process. The first one determines whether a firm obtains or not access
to an innovation – irrespectively of whether it is ultimately a success or a failure – through a
draw from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter:
θini,t = 1− e−ζ1INi,t (12)
and parameter ζ1 ∈ (0, 1]. If a firm innovates, it may draw a new machine-embodying technology
(Aini,t, B
in
i,t) according to:
Aini,t = Ai,t(1 + x
A
i,t) (13)
Bini,t = Bi,t(1 + x
B
i,t) (14)
where xAi,t and x
A
i,t are two independent draws from a Beta(α1, β1) distribution, (α1, β1) ∈ R2+
over the fixed support [
¯
x1, x¯1] ⊂ R.
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Imitation also follows a two-step procedure. The access to imitation come from sampling a
Bernoulli with parameter:
θimi,t = 1− e−ζ2IMi,t (15)
and ζ2 ∈ (0, 1]. Firms accessing the second stage are able to copy the technology (Aimi , Bimi ) of
one of the competitors. Finally, they select the machine to produce according to the rule:
min[phi,t + bc
h
Ahi ,j,t
], h = τ, in, im (16)
where b ∈ R+ is a payback parameter.
Firms in consumption-good sector do not conduct R&D, instead they access new technologies
incorporating new machines to their existing capital stock Ξj,t−1. Firms invest according to
expected demand Dej,t, computed by an adaptive rule:
Dej,t = g(Dj,t−1, Dj,t−2, Dj,t−h), 0 < h < t (17)
where Dj,t−h is the actual demand faced by firms at time t− h (h ∈ N∗ is a parameter and g :
Rh → R+ is the expectation function, here an unweighted moving average over 4 periods). The
corresponding desired level of production Qdj,t, considering the actual inventories from previous
period Nj,t−1, is:
Qdj,t = (1 + ι)D
e
j,t −Nj,t−1 (18)
being Ndj,t = ιD
e
j,t the desired inventories and ι ∈ R+, a parameter.
If the desired capital stock Kdj – computed as a linear function of the desired level of pro-
duction Qdj,t – is higher than the current one, firms invest EI
d
j,t to expand their production
capacity:
EIdj,t = K
d
j,t −Kj,t−1. (19)
Firms also invest SIdj,t to replace machines by more productive vintages according to a fixed
payback period (b > 0) rule, substituting machines Aτi ∈ Ξj,t according to its obsolescence as
well as the price of new machines:
RSj,t =
{
Aτi ∈ Ξj,t :
p∗i,t
c
Aτi
j,t − c∗j,t
≤ b
}
(20)
where p∗i,t ∈ R+ and c∗j,t ∈ R+ are the price and unit cost of production upon the new machines.
Given the stock of machines Ξj,t, firms compute average productivity pij,t and average unit cost
of production cj,t, based on the average unit labour cost of production wj,t associated with each
machine of vintage τ in its capital stock:
c
Aτi
j,t =
wj,t
Aτi
. (21)
Consumption-good prices are set applying a markup µj,t on average unit costs:
pj,t = (1 + µj,t)cj,t. (22)
Mark-up changes are regulated by the evolution of firm market shares (fj,t):
µj,t = µj,t−1
(
1 + υ
fj,t−1 − fj,t−2
fj,t−2
)
(23)
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with υ ∈ (0, 1). Firm market shares evolve according to a replicator dynamics:
fj,t = fj,t−1
(
1 + χ
Ej,t − E¯t
E¯t
)
(24)
where the firms relative competitivity Ej,t is defined based on the individual normalized prices
p′j,t and unfilled demands l
′
j,t:
Ej,t = −ω1p′j,t−1 − ω1l′j,t−1, E¯t =
1
F 2t
∑
j
Ej,tfj,t−1 (25)
being (ω1, ω1) ∈ R2 parameters.
Labour market and search and match process
Labour demand in the consumption-good sector Ldj,t is determined by desired production Q
d
j,t
and the average productivity of current capital stock Aj,t:
Ldj,t =
Qdj,t
Aj,t
. (26)
In the capital-good sector, instead, Ldi,t considers orders Qi,t and labour productivity Bi,t. In
what follows, only the behaviour of the consumption-good sector (subscript j) is shown as the
capital-good firms operate under the same rules in the labour market, except they follow the
wage offers from top-paying firms in the former sector.
Firms decide whether to hire (or fire) workers according to the expected production Qdj,t. If
it is increasing, ∆Ldj,t new workers are (tentatively) hired in addition to the existing number
Lj,t−1. Each firm (expectedly) get a fraction of the number of applicant workers La,t in its
candidates queue {`sj,t}, proportional to firm market share fj,t−1:
E(Lsj,t) = ωLa,tfj,t−1 (27)
where ω ∈ R+ is a parameter defining the number of job queues each seeker joins, in average.
Considering the set of workers in {`sj,t}, each firm select the subset of desired workers {`dj,t} to
make a job (wage) offer:
{`dj,t} = {`j,t ∈ {`sj,t} : wr`,t < woj,t}, {`dj,t} ⊆ {`sj,t}. (28)
Firms target workers that would accept the wage offer woj,t, considering the wage w
r
`,t requested
by workers, if any. Each firm hires workers up to its demand ∆Ldj,t, or to all workers in its queue,
and the number of effectively hired workers (the set {`hj,t}) is:
#{`hj,t} = ∆Lj,t ≤ ∆Ldj,t ≤ Lsj,t = #{`sj,t}, ∆Lj,t = Lj,t − Lj,t−1. (29)
The search, wage determination and firing processes differ according to the policy regime. In
the Fordist regime, workers never quit jobs and firms fire employees only under losses (Πj,t−1 < 0)
and shrinking desired production (Qdj,t < Qj,t−1), except if exiting the market. Only unemployed
workers search for jobs. Additionally, lowest skilled workers are fired first, while higher skilled
workers are preferred when hiring as in this regime wages are not bargained. Firms offer a wage:
woj,t = w
o
j,t−1(1 +WPj,t) bounded to w
max
j,t = pj,t−1Aj,t−1, (30)
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that is accepted by the worker if she has no better offer. The positive wage premium is is defined
as:
WP j,t = ψ2
∆At
At−1
+ ψ4
∆Aj,t
Aj,t−1
, ψ1 + ψ2 ≤ 1 (31)
being At the aggregate labour productivity, ∆, the time difference operator, and (ψ1, ψ2) ∈
R2+, parameters. So, wages are linked to firm specific performance and also to the aggregate
productivity dynamics. woj,t is simultaneously applied to all firm’s workers. w
o
j,t is bounded to a
maximum break-even wage wmaxj,t (the zero unit profits myopic expectation).
In the Competitive setting, firms freely fire workers and employees actively search for better
jobs while employed, quitting when there is a better offer. When hiring or firing, firms give
precedence to workers with a higher skills-to-wage ratio (s`t/w
`
t), contracting them first and
dismissing last. The matching is done by an one-round bargaining process. Workers have
a reservation wage equal to the unemployment benefit wut they receive from the Government
when unemployed, if any, and request an wage wr`,t during the job application:
wr`,t =
w`,t−1(1 + ) if employed in t-1ws`,t if unemployed in t-1. (32)
w`,t−1 is the current wage for the employed workers and  ∈ R+, a parameter. Unemployed
workers have a gradually shrinking satisfying wage ws`,t, accounting for their recent wage history:
ws`,t = max
(
wut ,
1
Ts
Ts∑
h=1
w`,t−h
)
, (33)
being Ts ∈ N∗, the time-span parameter of the moving-average of the past income. A employed
worker accepts the best offer woj,t she receives if it is higher than her current wage w`,t. An
unemployed worker accepts the best offer she gets, if any, as all offers are at least equal to the
unemployment benefit wut .
In all cases, Government establishes an institutional minimum wage wmint , as the lower bound
to the firm wage setting behaviour:
wmint = w
min
t−1
(
1 + ψ1
∆At
At−1
)
. (34)
Model closure
Government taxes firms profits at a fixed rate tr ∈ R+, and provides a benefit wut to unemployed
workers which is a fraction of the current average wage:
wut = ψ
1
LDt−1
LDt−1∑
`=1
w`,t−1 (35)
where ψ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter and LDt , the total labour demand. Therefore, the Government
expenses are:
Gt = w
u
t (L
S − LDt ). (36)
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Workers fully consume their income (if possible) and do not get credit. Accordingly, desired
aggregate consumption Cdt depends on the income of both employed and unemployed workers
plus the desired unsatisfied consumption from previous periods (Cdt−1 − Ct−1):
Cdt =
∑
`
w`,t +Gt + (C
d
t−1 − Ct−1) (37)
The effective consumption Ctis bound by the real production Q
2
t of the consumption-good sector:
Ct = min(C
d
t , Q
2
t ), Q
2
t =
∑
j
Qj,t. (38)
The model applies the standard national account identities by the simple aggregation of
agents’ stocks and flows. The aggregate value added by capital- and consumption-good firms Yt
equals their aggregated production Q1t and Q
2
t , respectively (there are no intermediate goods).
In turn, it is equal to the sum of the effective consumption Ct, the total investment It and the
change in firm’s inventories ∆Nt:
Q1t +Q
2
t = Yt = Ct + It + ∆Nt. (39)
For further details, see Dosi et al. (2010) and Dosi et al. (2017).
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Appendix B
Symbol Description Value Min. Max. µ∗ Direct Interaction
Policy
φ Unemployment subsidy rate on average wage 0.40 0.00 1.00 4.82 − −
r Interest rate 0.01 0.00 0.10 8.27 0.006 0.001
tr Tax rate 0.10 0.00 0.30 4.24 0.001 0.001
(Λ,Λmin) Prudential limit on debt (sales multiple/fixed floor) (2, 20000) (1, 0) (4, 100000) (6.89, 2.07) (−,−) (−,−)
Labour market
 Minimum desired wage increase rate 0.020 0.005 0.200 6.33 0.000 0.000
τ Skills accumulation rate 0.010 0.001 0.100 11.0 0.714 0.030
Tr Number of periods before retirement (work life) 120 60 240 3.96 0.032 0.012
Ts Number of wage memory periods 0 1 8 0.66 − −
(ω, ωun) Number of firms to send applications (empl./unempl.) (0, 5) (1, 1) (20, 20) (2.87, 8.92) (−, 0.002) (−, 0.001)
(ψ2, ψ4) Aggregate/firm-level productivity pass-trough (0.50, 0.50) (0.95, 0.00) (1.05, 1.00) (11.1, 5.38) (−,−) (−,−)
Technology
η Maximum machine-tools useful life 20 10 40 10.9 0.000 0.002
ν R&D investment propensity over sales 0.04 0.01 0.20 2.58 − −
ξ Share of R&D expenditure in imitation 0.50 0.20 0.80 9.78 − −
b Payback period for machine replacement 3 1 10 7.72 0.007 0.001
dimmach Machine-tool unit production capacity 40 10 100 7.88 0.014 0.002
(α1, β1) Beta distribution parameters (innovation process) (3, 3) (1, 1) (5, 5) (8.96, 5.21) − −
(α2, β2) Beta distribution parameters (entrant productivity) (2, 4) (1, 1) (5, 5) (5.89, 10.3) (−, 0.000) (−, 0.001)
(ζ1, ζ2) Search capabilities for innovation/imitation (0.30, 0.30) (0.10, 0.10) (0.60, 0.60) (6.91, 4.91) (−,−) (−,−)
[
¯
x1, x¯1] Beta distribution support (innovation process ) [−0.15, 0.15] [−0.3, 0.1] [−0.1, 0.3] (4.16, 4.74) (−, 0.012) (−, 0.001)
(continue...)
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Symbol Description Value Min. Max. µ∗ Direct Interaction
Industrial dynamics
γ Share of new customers for capital-good firm 0.50 0.20 0.80 8.45 − −
ι Desired inventories share 0.10 0.00 0.30 5.98 0.000 0.001
µ1 Mark-up in capital-good sector 0.05 0.01 0.20 7.76 0.000 0.001
o Weight of market conditions for entry decision 0.50 0.00 1.00 3.80 − −
χ Replicator dynamics coefficient (compet. intensity) 1.0 0.2 5.0 9.13 0.056 0.001
υ Mark-up adjustment coefficient 0.04 0.01 0.10 5.05 − −
u Planned utilization by consumption-good entrant 0.75 0.50 1.00 5.35 0.034 0.001
x5 Maximum technical advantage of capital-good entrant 0.30 0.00 1.00 8.97 0.030 0.001
exit1 Minimum orders to stay in capital-good sector 1 1 5 3.90 − −
exit2 Minimum share to stay in consumption-good sector 10
−5 10−6 10−3 3.38 − −
[Φ1,Φ2] Min/maximum capital ratio for consumer-good entrant [0.10, 0.90] [0.00, 0.50] [0.50, 1.00] (5.43, 11.6) (0.031,−) (0.001,−)
[Φ3,Φ4] Min/maximum net wealth ratio for capital-good entrant [0.10, 0.90] [0.00, 0.50] [0.50, 1.00] (8.68, 5.00) (0.001, 0.003) (0.001, 0.001)
(ω1, ω2) Competitiveness weight for price/unfilled demand (1.0, 1.0) (0.2, 0.2) (5.0, 5.0) (7.97, 12.5) (−, 0.004) (−, 0.000)
[
¯
x2, x¯2] Entry randomness distribution support & limit [−0.15, 0.15] [−0.3, 0.1] [−0.1, 0.3] (8.91, 10.9) (0.002, 0.001) (0.001, 0.002)
[F 1min, F
1
max] Minimum/maximum number of capital-good firms [10, 100] [10, 20] [20, 100] (15.3, 19.9) (−, 0.001) (−, 0.003)
[F 2min, F
2
max] Minimum/maximum number of consumer-good firms [50, 500] [50, 200] [200, 500] (5.90, 6.59) (−, 0.014) (−, 0.012)
Initial conditions
µ20 Initial mark-up in consumption-good sector 0.20 0.10 0.50 10.54 0.003 0.001
K0 Initial capital stock in consumer-good sector 800 200 3000 3.72 − −
LS0 Number of workers 250000 50000 1000000 8.17 0.012 0.001
(F 10 , F
2
0 ) Initial number of capital/consumption-good firms (20, 200) (10, 50) (100, 500) (6.39, 7.49) (−,−) (−,−)
(NW 10 , NW
2
0 ) Initial net wealth in capital/consumption-good sector (10000, 5000) (2000, 2000) (50000, 50000) (5.62, 5.59) (0.005, 0.001) (0.008, 0.005)
Table 7: Model parameters and initial conditions, calibration values, minimum-maximum range for sensitivity analisys, Elementary Effects µ∗ statistic and Sobol
decomposition direct and interaction effects indexes.
Baseline policy-specific values (Fordist regime).
Sensitivity analysis statistics relative to GDP crises recovery losses indicator averages for both regimes.
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Parameter Description Fordist Competitive
ω Number of firms to send applications 0 5
φ Unemployment subsidy rate on average wage 0.4 0.2
Ts Number of wage memory periods 0 4
r Interest rate 0.010 0.005
tr Tax rate 0.015 0.010
Table 8: Regime-specific parameter values.
Workers Capital-good firms Consumption-good firms Bank Government
∑
current capital current capital current capital
Consumption −C +C 0
Investment +I −I 0
Govt. expenditures +G −G 0
Wages +W −W 1 −W 2 0
Profits, firms −Π1 +Π1 −Π2 +Π2 0
Profits, bank −Πb +Πb 0
Debt interests −rDeb1t−1 −rDeb2t−1 +rDebt−1 0
Deposits interests +rNW 1t−1 +rNW
2
t−1 −rNWt−1 0
Taxes −Tax1 −Tax2 +Tax 0
Change in debt +∆Deb1 +∆Deb2 −∆Deb 0
Change in deposits −∆NW 1 −∆NW 2 +∆NW 0∑
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0∗ 0∗
Table 9: Stock-and-flow consistency: transaction flow matrix.
(*) Government deficit/superavit is close to zero in the long run.
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